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Greece between Europe and the Mediterranean, 
1981-1986. 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Greek-
Libyan Relations as Case Studies Sofia 
PAPASTAMKOU 
Sofia PAPASTAMKOU 
 
 
Abstract: This article examines aspects of the foreign policy of Greece’s socialist 
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou regarding the Mediterranean from 1981 to 1986. 
The Mediterranean was one of the three circles of Papandreou's “multidimensional” 
approach in foreign policy, a conceptualized one that encompassed Greece's Arab 
policy, mainly from a third road point of view. Two case studies are considered, 
the Greek-Palestinian and the Greek-Libyan connections, principally from a European 
perspective. Opting for a global rather than a bilateral perspective allows to 
fully appreciate the evolution of Greek foreign attitudes at the time mainly from 
the perspective of their Europeanisation. 
 
 
In October 1981, Andreas Papandreou, founder and charismatic leader of 
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), brought the Socialists into 
power for the first time in Greece's postwar history. He was considered 
to be the man of change in all domains, including foreign policy. 
Papandreou preached a third world neutralist stance and his pre-
electoral speeches promised to readjust relations with the US, NATO and 
the EEC, of which Greece became full member that very year. This 
article examines the foreign policy of Papandreou regarding 
Mediterranean affairs from 1981 to 1986, principally from a European 
perspective. Opting for a global rather than a bilateral perspective 
allows us to better understand an essential aspect of Greek foreign 
attitudes at the time: their Europeanization. Moreover, from the point 
of view of European unification history, this approach helps to shed 
light on aspects of Euro-Arab relations in a period that followed the 
deadlock of the Euro-Arab dialogue but was yet far from the launch of 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In parallel, from an international 
history point of view, the period covers the Second Cold War and sees 
the rise of the concept of war against international terrorism. It is 
in this context that two case studies receive special attention: the 
Greek-Palestinian and the Greek-Libyan connection. 
 
The Mediterranean in Andreas Papandreou's 
Foreign Policy Views 
 
According to Papandreou's views, Greece was part of three circles: 
Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. These were the cores of his 
so-called “multidimensional policy”, one that attached more importance 
to the North-South rather than to the East-West divide.
1
 The term 
“Mediterranean” was systematically used to describe relations with “the 
Mediterranean people”, especially “the Arab Nation”, instead of the 
terms “Orient” and “Arab World” used by his (conservative) predecessors 
up until then. Greece's Arab policy traditionally took into 
consideration dependence on the Middle East oil provisions, the 
geographical proximity, the presence of Greek communities and economic 
activity of Greek nationals in the Arab countries, the existence of 
three orthodox Patriarchates (Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch).
2
 The 
Cyprus affair and the need for Arab support in the international 
organizations were added to these factors from the fifties onwards.
3
 
What seemed new in Papandreou's views was his neutralist stance and the 
willingness to give substance to the idea of Greece being an integral 
part of the Mediterranean world, in the sense of being at once a 
European and a developing country, because of its troubled and rich in 
foreign interventions post-war history, perceived as unique for a NATO 
and EEC member state. Notwithstanding his dominant personality, 
Papandreou's neutralist stance was representative of the majority of 
the senior party members.
4
 
Papandreou's views on international relations and the place of 
Greece in the world were developed under the influence of his proper 
intellectual orientations and career in the USA, and his experience of 
the Greek political arena in the sixties. Through his studies, academic 
career and political action in the USA, where he lived for almost 
twenty years until 1959, Papandreou was linked to the liberal wing of 
the Democrats and to a network composed of influential personalities, 
such as the economists John Kenneth Galbraith and Carl Kaysen, who 
would later serve in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
5
 During 
his brief political career in Greece after 1963, he was marked by the 
first Cyprus crisis in 1963-64 and witnessed the exercise of 
international politics in the Eastern Mediterranean from within, as he 
was present at the US-Greek contacts in Washington regarding the crisis 
containment.
6
 As he admitted, the Cyprus crisis constituted his 
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political awakening in international relations and forged his views on 
the exercise of foreign policy from the point of view of a small state. 
The military Junta of 1967-1974 further radicalised his political 
thinking. His book Paternalistic Capitalism, published in 1972, 
reflects his orientation from the orthodox economist he had been until 
then towards the dependency theory and more radical US intelligentsia 
such as neo-marxist economists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy or Richard J. 
Barnett, founder of the Institute for Policy Studies.
7
 According to his 
academic colleagues, the book was mainly a political manifesto that 
reflected the author's own experiences and the perspective of a small 
state.
8
 Indeed, Papandreou's ideas on international affairs were a mix 
of global conceptions nourished in the USA and his personal experiences 
at a local level. 
One cannot consider the Mediterranean and Greece's place in it 
without encompassing the realities of the Greek-Turkish relationship 
and the problem of Cyprus, especially after the division of the island 
in 1974. The latter aspects, however, were distinctively considered as 
the Greek “national matters” in foreign affairs and defence, what has 
precisely been conceptualized as the core versus periphery policies.
9
 
This article focuses on aspects of the periphery Mediterranean 
policies, though considering the connections with the Cyprus problem 
and the Greek-Turkish relations, as well as the ways in which they 
formed part of the Greek-US relationship. 
 
The Greek Attitude towards the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict in the EPC Framework 
 
The Greek-Palestinian connection is one domain where Andreas Papandreou 
showed a remarkable consistency.
10
 His support of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) was not separate from his Realpolitik 
concerns: it was an accessory of Greece's policy towards Turkey, as he 
admitted to Foreign Minister of France Claude Cheysson in 1981.
11
 The 
common ground between Greeks and Palestinians from this point of view 
was very likely the support the PLO provided to the Kurdistan Workers' 
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Party (PKK). Indeed, after the 1980 military coup d'état in Turkey, 
Kurdish guerrilla forces had been installed in Lebanon where they 
received PLO (and Syrian) backing.
12
 But ideology – anti-Americanism – 
and emotion were driving forces as well. Parallels were largely drawn 
by the PASOK militants between Israel and Turkey, perceived to be 
offered unconditional backing by the US in the Middle East. Another key 
determinant of their solidarity towards the Palestinians was the 
Cypriot experience of partition and exodus, and even the collective 
memory of Asia Minor Greeks exodus after 1922.
13
 
When Papandreou came to power in 1981, the PLO already had an 
information office in Athens but no official recognition from the Greek 
government. Israel, on the other hand, had been granted only de facto 
recognition from Greece since 1949, although the two countries held 
relations through diplomatic representations.
14
 Right after his 
election, Papandreou invited Yasser Arafat to visit Greece in order to 
hold discussions on the upgrading of the PLO office in Athens to that 
of a diplomatic mission, indeed to the same level as Israel's. This was 
already annoying for the Israelis for prestige matters but their 
worries were far more general. Papandreou's invitation coincided with 
the launch of the second wave of the PLO's campaign for international 
recognition. The first one occurred from 1974 to 1979 and had been 
successful mainly in third world countries. In 1981, Arafat's efforts 
met with success not only in Greece, but also in the USSR and Japan, 
this second country being a temporary member of the UN Security Council 
at the time.
15
 With Greece officially joining the EEC that year, Israel 
worried about the country becoming the voice of the PLO in the common 
Western European instances. 
Papandreou, who was an opponent of the Camp David accords, 
confirmed these apprehensions shortly after his election, when the 
Greek government impeded the adoption of a collective European 
                                                 
12   O. BENGIO, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of 
Middle Eastern Outsiders, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p.137; S.A. 
PLAKOUDAS, The PKK and the Guerrilla Tradition of Turkey's Kurds, in: 
MERIA, 4(2014), <http://www.rubincenter.org/2015/02/the-pkk-and-the-
guerrilla-tradition-of-turkeys-kurds/> [All URL cited in this article were 
accessed on 4 March 2015]. 
13   See interviews of militants in RORI 2002, pp.111-113. For the 
the exodus of Asia Minor Greeks see A. JAMES, Memories of Anatolia: 
generating Greek refugee identity, in: Balkanologie, 1-2(2001), 
<http://balkanologie.revues.org/720>.  
14   Israel State Archives, http://www.archives.gov.il/, Greece's 
Relations with Israel, 1961-1967, 
<http://www.archives.gov.il/archivegov_eng/publications/electronicpirsum/gr
eece/introduction1.htm>.  
15   JTA [Jewish Telegraphic Agency], Archive, www.jta.org, “News 
Brief”, 11.12.1981, <http://www.jta.org/1981/12/11/archive/palestine-
liberation-organization-leader-yasir-arafat-is-scheduled>; “Study Says PLO 
Exaggerates Its International Success”, 22.12.1981, 
<http://www.jta.org/1981/12/22/archive/study-says-plo-exaggerates-its-
international-success>; TNA [The National Archives], PRO FCO 9/3187, Athens 
to FCO, 280, 23.10.1981. M. HILL, The Emergence of the Palestinians since 
1948, Part Two: The Palestinians after the creation of Israel, in: Journal 
of Arabic, Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies, 1(1999), pp.45-59. 
Political Cooperation (EPC) decision on the proposed participation of 
the UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands in the multinational force of 
Sinai.
16
 A compromise was found by issuing a two-fold declaration. A 
joint one considered the decision of the four as being in accordance 
with the wish of the EEC to facilitate a peace settlement in the Middle 
East, according to the rights of all states to existence and security 
and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. The second one 
was a common declaration between the four participating states, 
mentioning the Camp David Accords and the Venice Declaration.
17
 
As for East-West relations, Greek views on Middle Eastern matters 
were expected to raise impediments to the adoption of common decisions 
because of PASOK's sympathy for the third world causes, including 
support for the PLO. However, Greek positions on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict were not that unique. In many ways, they were 
parallel to the Irish views and sometimes coincided with those of the 
French and the Italians.
18
 But as the case of the 1982 Lebanon War 
highlights, Greek and Irish efforts in the EEC were at best able to 
contribute to the adoption of severe verbal stances against the Israeli 
military action and reiterate basic European positions on Palestinian 
national rights, in accordance with the 1980 Venice Declaration, only 
when backed by bigger members. In particular, it was mostly France's 
Middle Eastern policy that produced the conditions for Greek proposals 
to be adopted. It would thus be interesting to see whether there was 
actually any substance in what was perceived to be at the time a kind 
of special relationship. In both countries, the Socialists had come 
into office almost simultaneously. François Mitterrand was the first 
Socialist President of the Fifth Republic and Papandreou the first 
Socialist Prime Minister of post-war Greece. Both of them were 
perceived as the men of change in their respective countries. The two 
parties had close contacts since the mid-seventies as parts of a 
network of the Southern European socialist forces that developed after 
the fall of dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal.
19
 These links 
were further tied after the extension of this network to the Euro-
Mediterranean area following the Malta conference of 1977.
20
 Four days 
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after Papandreou's election in October, French envoys went to Athens to 
congratulate him on behalf of Mitterrand. When French Foreign Minister 
Cheysson visited Athens in December 1981, the Greek press celebrated 
the bond that allegedly united the two “Mediterranean, socialist and 
democratic” countries. According to former Minister Theodoros Pangalos, 
Andreas Papandreou had a special relation with Mitterrand, whom he 
admired, whereas the latter would keep an eye on the former because he 
apprehended his spontaneity – what the British called with less 
hesitation his “unpredictability”.
21
 
The basic foundations of France's foreign policy were essentially 
different from Greece's. France was more conscious of Cold War 
realities and, as a result, there was not much enthusiasm for Greece's 
neutralist views regarding the Balkans and the Mediterranean, except to 
the extent that this could be useful for issues of special French 
interest.
22
 In the Middle East, there were fundamental differences of 
approach. The French Socialists, contrary to their Greek comrades, had 
established contacts both with the PLO representatives in France and 
the Israeli socialist parties (Israeli Labour Party, Mapam, Moked). 
Mitterrand was a supporter of the Camp David accords and the matter of 
the multinational force of Sinai was clearly the object of French-Greek 
disagreement during Papandreou's visit to Paris in November 1981.
23
 
Mitterrand himself was a friend of Israel yet committed to an even-
handed approach of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as he had plainly 
recognised the right of the Palestinians to self-determination since 
1976. French relations with the PLO were far more complicated an issue, 
but Foreign Minister Cheysson publicly defended pro-Arab positions and 
was involved in unofficial contacts with PLO dignitaries.
24
 France's 
Arab policy and shared militant views on the North-South divide 
produced the conditions for considering Papandreou a potentially useful 
friend regarding the Mediterranean issues, in spite of basic 
differences of approach. On the contrary, other – Conservative ruled – 
country members such as the UK and Belgium were far more reserved and 
even willing to isolate Greece in order not to allow Papandreou to 
weaken common EPC decisions.
25
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The 1982 Lebanon War 
 
On 3 June 1982, the terrorist organisation of Abu Nidal perpetrated an 
attack against Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador in London. Though 
relations between Abu Nidal and the PLO were conflictual, Israel 
responded by launching operation Peace for Galilee in Southern Lebanon, 
with the aim of expelling all Palestinian military forces from the 
country in an effort to secure its Northern border.
26
 Greece's official 
reaction condemned the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, repeated support 
for a global solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the 
UN Security Council resolution 242 of 1967 and the principle of the 
right of the Palestinians to independence, and reiterated support for 
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
27
 At the 
same time, Greece engaged diplomatic activity in the EEC. On 7 June, 
the day following the launch of the Israeli operation, the Greek 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked formally for an extraordinary EPC 
meeting to be held. Preliminary contacts were held at different levels 
(UN Representatives, Political Committee, Foreign Ministries’ 
directors) and, on 9 June, the ten members of the EEC released a 
statement that condemned the invasion of Lebanon as a violation of 
international law and contrary to the efforts to achieve a peaceful 
settlement in the Middle East. The statement expressed support for 
Lebanon’s territorial integrity and called for respect of UN 
resolutions 508 and 509 regarding an immediate withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the country and UNIFIL action. It finally reiterated the 
European position in favour of the establishment of a global peace in 
the region.
28
 
However, this common statement did not mean real convergence 
towards an active European approach. This became plainly evident when 
the Israeli operation extended beyond Southern Lebanon and France 
adopted a more active stance that failed to find European support. 
Mitterrand's first official declarations had remained balanced towards 
Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian action in Lebanon, but the siege of 
West Beirut after 13 June incited him to undertake an intense 
international activity in order to preserve the PLO as an interlocutor 
in any peace solution. Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO political section 
chief, was received in Paris where he met Premier Pierre Mauroy, 
Foreign Minister Cheysson and Secretary General of the Socialist Party 
Lionel Jospin. These contacts were part of the French activity in the 
UN, where concerted French-Egyptian action sought to amend the UN 
resolution 242 to also include the Palestinian national rights. Such 
French activity was opposed by the USA and found limited, if any, 
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support among the European partners except for Greece. The Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Netherlands opposed any explicit 
reference to the PLO in the European statements, as well as imposing 
serious economic sanctions on Israel.
29
 Furthermore, the Lebanon War was 
precisely the moment when British priorities shifted in favour of the 
Anglo-American relationship. US support to the UK during the Falklands 
War, the departure of Secretary of State Lord Carrington from the 
Foreign Office and Margaret Thatcher's complete alignment with Ronald 
Reagan, determined the British policy direction in a way that British 
influence was used to limit European support to the PLO and align the 
EEC with the US in the Middle East.
30
 
After Paris, Kaddoumi visited Athens where Papandreou assured him 
of Greece's support for the Palestinian cause. During Kaddoumi's visit, 
Papandreou violently condemned the Israeli military operations in 
Lebanon, comparing the action of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
against the Palestinian people to Nazi crimes. The use of the legacy of 
the Second World War was neither new nor original in the verbal wars 
surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the 1980 Venice 
Declaration, the Israelis compared the PLO to the SS and Arafat to 
Hitler. Official PLO communication assimilated Zionism – the state of 
Israel not being mentioned as such – to racism and nazism since the 
1970s.
31
 But these perceptions were further generalized during the 1982 
Lebanon War and even internationalized, especially after the Sabra and 
Shatila massacres. The impact was felt in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Denmark and even the FRG. So it did in France.
32
 But Papandreou was the 
first Greek Prime Minister to completely identify his views with these 
of one of the conflicting parties. By importing this kind of discourse 
into the Greek public space, at the highest level, he contributed to 
the tensions the Lebanon War gave rise to in the Greek society, mainly 
through a partial coverage of the event by the Greek media.
33
 
What was at stake behind these diplomatic contacts and the 
continuing military operations in Lebanon was the evacuation of Beirut 
by the PLO fighters. In August, a multinational force (MNF) composed of 
US, French and Italian contingents arrived at the Lebanese capital in 
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order to oversee the departure of the Palestinian armed forces, while 
the siege of Beirut West by Israeli forces continued. France had tried 
to associate a Greek contingent as well, as a means to attenuate Soviet 
distrust. Papandreou was positive but no formal request was made by the 
Lebanese government.
34
 When Yasser Arafat left Beirut, aboard a Greek 
merchant ship, Greece was his first destination. As he declared, this 
was “a deliberate gesture to criticize all the Arab leaders for their 
stand during the Beirut siege”, considering that the Greek government 
had been more supportive.
35
 Indeed, no Arab country had shown 
willingness to host the PLO on its soil after its departure from 
Lebanon.
36
 On the other hand, when Arafat landed in Athens on 1
st
 
September, Mitterrand had just started a two day visit to the Greek 
capital. Although, according to the Greek government, this was a 
coincidence, the archive of Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek 
President, echoes rumours that Papandreou had tried to arrange a 
meeting between Arafat and Mitterrand, something the Elysée officially 
and publicly excluded.
37
 
In September 1982, there was fresh diplomatic activity on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 1
st
 September, the Reagan Plan denied 
support to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and 
excluded permanent control or annexation by Israel. The plan called for 
a Jordanian-Palestinian association after a five-year transitional 
period of self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, the 
12
th
 Arab League summit issued a declaration at Fez, Morocco, on 9 
September, calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state and recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinians.
38
 These initiatives led to a new statement of the Ten. 
Its release was precipitated by the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, 
who was soon to take office as President of Lebanon, on 14 September, 
and the Sabra and Shatila massacres of civil Palestinians by Lebanese 
Christian militia soon after. The statement called for the immediate 
withdrawal of all Israeli forces from West Beirut and of all foreign 
military, except for the UNIFIL. It underlined the need for a global 
peace solution in the Middle East and the association of the PLO to all 
future negotiations. Recognition of Israel's right to a secure 
existence and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination should be 
included, the statement said, in any peace solution. Finally, it 
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approved the Reagan Plan and also mentioned the Fez Statement as an 
expression of the will of its signatories, including the PLO, to work 
for peace in the Middle East. The statement's formulation was an 
outcome of Greek, Irish and French amendments of a project initially 
prepared by the Danish who held the EEC presidency at the time. The 
Greeks were eager that the Fez statement be underlined and so were the 
Irish, who wished to see a strong condemnation of the Israeli military 
occupation of West Beirut and an explicit mention of the Palestinians’ 
right to self-determination. The Irish argument was that the common 
European statement should take care to leave the door open to the 
future participation of the PLO in any peace negotiations, especially 
in the light of its withdrawal from Lebanon. French backing of these 
proposals allowed the adoption of the final text, not least because the 
widespread emotion the Sabra and Shatila massacres had an impact on the 
attitude of all the European partners.
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The Greek EEC Presidency, July-December 1983 
 
The first Greek presidency of the EEC occurred in the second semester 
of 1983. It did not lead to any major evolution of the common European 
position regarding the Middle East matters. The EEC countries opted for 
a low profile during an international conference on the Palestinian 
question, held during the summer in Geneva, with Greece being the only 
member to fully participate. Also, Greece hosted a new session of the 
Euro-Arab Dialogue four years after its stalemate. However, this 
temporary reactivation bore no fruits, because it was clearly 
associated to political considerations regarding the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
An international conference on Palestine was held from 29 August 
to 7 September 1983 at the UN Office at Geneva, following previous UN 
General Assembly resolutions voted in 1981 and 1982.
40
 Initially, the 
conference was to be held at the headquarters of the UNESCO in Paris. 
But Mitterrand was not keen to host it on French soil and was able to 
obtain from the PLO that the conference be held in Geneva rather than 
in Paris. Mitterrand was under Israeli and US pressure, but his 
reluctance was also a sign of a less engaged policy towards Middle 
Eastern affairs and of his will to avoid further social tensions, as a 
result of the linking of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the 
anti-Semitic terrorist attack against the Goldenberg restaurant in 
Paris, in August 1982.
41
 The Geneva declaration, issued at the end of 
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the conference, reflected the will to give weight to the Fez Statement: 
a programme of action based on the Fez principles was proposed as a 
framework for convening a future international peace conference on the 
Middle East, bringing together all existing relevant UN resolutions, 
with a view to establish an independent Palestinian state.
42
 
Of all the EEC countries Greece was the only one to participate as 
a full member at the conference, the rest of them assisting as 
observers. Although the Greek delegation expressed its full support to 
the conference's goals, it also distanced itself from all provisions 
that could harm its bilateral relations with Israel as incompatible 
with the common economic and trade policies of the EEC. Greece also 
defended the EEC, who was criticized as not having welcomed “all 
initiatives based on the recognition of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people”, essentially the Fez plan, by reminding the 
conference of all the relevant European declarations. Greece's full 
participation in the conference showed the high price Papandreou 
continued to put on relations with the Arab and non-aligned countries, 
especially at the UN. But it also highlighted the inability of Greece 
to influence its European partners and to fulfil a much sought after 
role of bridge between Europe and the Arab states. 
This was further shown during the short-lived revival of the Euro-
Arab Dialogue (EAD) in December of the same year. A combined result of 
the need to launch a global approach towards the Mediterranean 
countries and of the oil crisis of 1973, the establishment of the EAD 
was clearly seen from a political point of view by both sides from the 
beginning. For the EEC, it was part of the first attempts to develop 
the EPC. For the Arab League, it was also a means of de facto 
normalization of the PLO status in the international arena. However, 
the European tendency to precisely depoliticize the procedure and 
concentrate on the economic aspects, and the impact of the Camp David 
accords, led the EAD to a stalemate after 1979.
43
 The Lebanon War 
brought the subject back to the agenda as it was during the Summit of 
Fez that the Arab states agreed to try to reactivate the EAD procedure. 
In November 1982, contacts were held in Tunis between the Secretary 
General of the Arab League and the Embassy of Denmark (the country that 
held the EEC presidency in the second semester of 1982). The matter was 
handed to the German presidency in the first semester of 1983 but the 
Arab side delayed the process. Given the previous eagerness of the Arab 
League, it is probable that the delay was due to political 
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calculations, as Greece was the next country to take over the EEC 
presidency.
44
 
Further preparation work was undertaken by the European 
Coordination Group at the end of spring and was intensified in 
September in Athens, as the Political Committee of 11-12 July had 
decided that the meeting of the general commission of the EAD would be 
held in the Greek capital. Since the first contacts taken between the 
EEC and the Arab League, it was clear that the political aspects would 
be brought up during the dialogue next to the economic and cultural 
ones. The question was whether these aspects would dominate the agenda. 
On the one hand, the European Coordination Group wanted to fix a 
framework in order to contain the political side of the EAD. On the 
other hand, the Arab proposals wanted to bring the Europeans closer to 
the positions of the Fez Plan or, at least, have them publicly adopt a 
more independent stance vis-à-vis the Reagan Plan. Clearly, the 
reactivation of the EAD was associated to the search for a solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, it was out of the order of 
the day to fundamentally modify the European position and even the 
explicit reiteration of the Venice Declaration – as proposed by Greece 
in an effort of compromise – was excluded, in order to avoid giving the 
EAD the aspect of a parallel negotiation forum.
45
 
Before the Athens European Council of 4-6 December 1983, most 
countries seemed to agree on the need to make a declaration on the 
Middle East, but no final consensus was reached. Greece proposed to 
revive the effort of a global approach for the Middle East by combining 
the Reagan and Fez plans. The UK, on the other hand, proposed a general 
statement of principles in order to reassure the Arab countries that 
Europe had actually a role to play, to define clearly the European 
objectives regarding Lebanon (phased withdrawal of all foreign military 
forces including the MNF within a given period, national 
reconciliation, UNIFIL action) and to provide for further diplomatic 
activity in accordance with the Reagan Plan. Ireland and Italy 
essentially agreed with the British proposals. The FRG, on the 
contrary, was in favour of a more reserved statement. Finally, France 
proposed a global European-led approach, in the spirit of the 
conclusions of the Solemn Declaration of the European Union of 19 June 
1983 in favour of the reinforcement of the EPC, and in accordance with 
previous French action in the UN.
46
 In the end, the Athens European 
Council did not produce a common statement due to complete disagreement 
on the proposed reforms of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and to 
common financing mechanisms.
47
 Not surprisingly, it avoided any 
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discussion of major international matters, something that reportedly 
disappointed Papandreou, who also sought a strong declaration against 
Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of the Northern 
Cyprus.
48
 
Against this background, the 5
th
 General Commission of the EAD took 
place in Athens on 14 December 1983. The meeting focused on future 
perspectives and a possible re-launch of the dialogue, but no essential 
progress was made. After the discussions were concluded, the EEC 
presidency issued a neutral statement referring to the utility of the 
exchanges and the agreement of both sides about the future continuation 
of the dialogue. No joint statement was issued though because no common 
ground was found regarding the political aspects of the EAD. Further 
technical contacts continued throughout 1984 but the pattern remained 
the same, with the Arab League trying to obtain some kind of political 
declaration on the Middle East on behalf of the EEC and the latter 
avoiding it.
49
 
Several days after the EAD meeting, Greece, Italy and France 
provided logistic support, under the UN flag, for the evacuation of PLO 
fighters from Northern Lebanon. But it was clear already, after the 
terrorist attacks against the French and US contingents of the MNF in 
Beirut in October 1983, that France had changed tactics by a more 
discreet, if at all, engaging in the Middle Eastern arena, not least 
because it failed to lead a European policy.
50
 France assured the EEC 
presidency in the first semester of 1984 and, as discussions held 
within the Political Committee show, was utterly unfavourable to any 
extension of the existing European declarations. After the retreat of 
its forces from Lebanon in March, France preferred that any initiative 
regarding Lebanese-Israeli security arrangements be left to the UN. 
Otherwise, Mitterrand was only favourable to the designation of a fact-
finding mission by Italy, the country to preside the EEC in the first 
semester of 1985, as a sign of the EEC's willingness to help in the 
search of a peace solution.
51
 Both François Mitterrand and Bettino 
Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister and head of the Italian Socialist 
Party, toured Arab countries in November 1984 and were in close 
contact. Papandreou, who had also visited Jordan and Syria at the same 
time, joined the game during the Dublin Summit of December 1984, where 
he asked by letter for the creation of a fact-finding mission.
52
 
Eventually, any reference to the designation of such a mission was 
deleted from the final EPC texts. The common statement released after 
the European Council of Dublin reaffirmed the previous official 
positions of the EEC in a generic way and without explicitly mentioning 
the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and independence. 
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No special role for the EEC was evoked, as had been the case in the 
Venice Declaration.
53
 As such, the Dublin statement remained within a 
perimeter defined by the Reagan Plan and showed that no particular 
European initiative was on the agenda. 
This was the line followed in 1985 by the Italian presidency. The 
Craxi-Mitterrand correspondence shows that they both agreed on the 
necessity for the EEC to keep itself limited to the exchange of views 
between its members within the framework of the EPC and to encourage a 
common Jordanian-Palestinian approach that was in progress after the 
meeting of the Palestine National Council in Amman in November 1984.
54
 
Following the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement of February 1985, the EPC 
meeting of 29 April 1985 in Luxembourg led to a statement expressing 
satisfaction and reaffirming that the EEC was willing to contribute to 
such a process on the basis of the principles previously expressed in 
the EEC statements regarding the right of all states to exist, Israel 
included, and the need to associate the PLO in any negotiations. In 
this context, Greece was too small a player to play a leading role, 
though the country followed closely all the relevant European 
activities in the Middle East countries which in any case had 
considerably slowed down.
55
 
 
The rise of the Greek-Libyan Connection, 1981-
1984 
 
Andreas Papandreou met Muammar Gaddafi for the first time in 1975 in 
Tripoli.
56
 He was encouraged to develop contacts with Libya by Vassos 
Lyssaridis, the leader of the Cypriot Labour Party (EDEK) and even 
Archbishop Michail Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Members of the PASOK executive committee, such as Manos Kafetzopoulos, 
later Ambassador in Tripoli, Akis Tsohatzopoulos, who served as 
Minister in several PASOK governments from 1981 to 2004, and Phaedon 
Metallinos, who later served in the Embassies of Paris and Luxembourg, 
visited Tripoli in 1976 and 1977.
57
 An association of Greek-Libyan 
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friendship was founded in 1978 by PASOK youths of the Trotskyist stream 
of the party. These contacts were further developed in the framework of 
the conferences of the Southern European and Mediterranean socialist 
and progressive parties from 1976 onwards. From a certain point of 
view, encouraged as they were by the Cypriots, Papandreou's contacts 
with Libya continued a tradition of relations with the non-alignment 
movement that Archbishop Makarios had established as a means of 
protection against Turkey, now placed at the level of a regional Euro-
Mediterranean network where the Greek Socialists tried to gain 
influence and in which neither Turkish nor Israeli political formations 
participated. Libya was the party's privileged interlocutor in North 
Africa. The country seemed attractive at the time because of its 
socialist-inspired economic model but these perceptions were to change 
after 1981 when the Libyans would be severely judged as unreliable 
economic partners. Post-“Arab Spring” perceptions make past contacts 
with Arab dictators appear, to say the very least, as sins of youth for 
the European leaders. However, such contacts were also part of a larger 
Euro-Mediterranean network in which many European Socialists, who would 
come to power in the eighties and would later be present at the launch 
of the Barcelona Process in 1995, participated.
58
 
To Libya, the network of the Mediterranean socialist parties 
represented a certain domain of international activity. Marginalised in 
the inter-Arab scene, out of rivalry with Egypt and Syria, and on bad 
terms with the US, Gaddafi's alternatives consisted in developing 
careful relations with the USSR and being active in three international 
domains: the Mediterranean region, Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, where he mainly backed dissident Palestinian formations that 
opposed Arafat, essentially the Abu Nidal Organization.
59
 From this 
point of view, Papandreou's election in 1981 provided Gaddafi with a 
much needed potential connexion to the EEC, other than the important 
bilateral economic ties he held mainly with Germany, Italy and France.
60
 
Manos Kafetzopoulos, who was not a diplomat but a party member, was 
appointed Ambassador in Tripoli. This was a sign of the importance 
Papandreou attached to the Greek-Libyan relationship. But it also 
highlighted his distrust of the Greek diplomatic corps that often 
served independently of the regime's change after 1974, as the previous 
Greek Ambassador in Libya had been appointed by the Colonels’ Junta.
61
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Kafetzopoulos was acquainted with Ahmad Shahati, chief of the Libyan 
Foreign Affairs Office, in the seventies, in the framework of the 
Mediterranean socialist conferences, but also with the Fatah section 
that was based in Tripoli, which made him a well-recognized actor in 
the bilateral relation between Tripoli and Athens. As Ambassador, he 
had liberty in his initiatives and direct communication with 
Papandreou.
62
 
Right after Papandreou's election, Colonel Gaddafi seemed eager to 
visit Athens but the idea was entirely opposed by the Greek President 
Karamanlis, who was cautious to preserve Greece's relations with the 
USA. According to Kafetzopoulos, Papandreou was not willing to harm his 
relations with Karamanlis over this. So, perhaps conveniently, 
Gaddafi's visit in Athens was soon off the agenda. Greek-Libyan 
economic relations paid the price, as oil exports to Greece and 
payments to construction companies active in Libya (a total of 120 
million dollars) ceased. However, things had returned to normal by June 
1982.
63
 It is not clear what made Gaddafi change his attitude, but this 
was probably due to Greece's activity over the Lebanon War and its 
links to France. Greece seemed then potentially useful in two domains 
that were crucial to Libya, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
Africa. Gaddafi had every reason to be on good terms with Papandreou, 
especially since the latter was not an enemy for him. The French-Libyan 
relations were strained at the time because of Libya's support to the 
opponents of the legal government of Chad that was backed by France. 
According to former Foreign Minister of France, Roland Dumas, Andreas 
Papandreou was one of the intermediaries Gaddafi used during this 
period to declare himself disposed to come to terms with the French 
regarding Chad, the other one being Bruno Kreisky. For Greece, except 
for their economic aspects, the importance of relations with Libya – 
and the Arab countries in general – was further underlined after the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 15 
November 1983 and its search for international recognition. In 
accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 541, the Arab states 
declared themselves to be opposed to the self-proclamation of the TRNC 
and did not grant it diplomatic recognition nor upgraded the observer 
status the Cypriot-Turkish community held in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference to full membership.
64
 
It was against this background that a meeting between Papandreou 
and Gaddafi came back on the agenda in 1984. The issue reportedly 
raised a big debate within governmental circles. Foreign Minister 
Yannos Haralambopoulos, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 
charge of the Mediterranean and Arab Affairs, Carolos Papoulias, Vice-
Minister of Economy Costis Vaitsos and Ambassador to Tripoli 
Kafetzopoulos between those who were convinced about the usefulness of 
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such a meeting and those concerned not to harm Greek-US relations. Once 
more, President Karamanlis objected to hosting Gaddafi in Athens.
65
 On 
Gaddafi's invitation, it was finally Andreas Papandreou who visited 
Tripoli on 23-24 September 1984. The press reported at the time the 
signing of a bilateral economic accord that provided for cooperation in 
the investment banking sector, technology transfers, infrastructure 
construction, and commercial relations of a total value of 1 billion 
dollars. Several years later, the accord was still not fully 
implemented, in part because of the reluctance of Greek companies to 
develop further activities in Libya.
66
 Moreover, a 75 million dollars 
contract regarding imports to Libya of anti-aircraft weapons made by 
the Greek Armament Industry did not go further because of US pressure 
put on Greece and Libya's backing of terrorist activities. Since its 
sudden announcement in mid-September, however, Papandreou's visit was 
mostly associated to a probable Greek mediation in Chad. France and 
Libya had agreed to mutually withdraw their military forces from this 
country following the mediation of Chancellor Kreisky on 15 September. 
But Gaddafi was not only interested in coming to terms with the French. 
He also wanted to do it in an official way by publicly meeting 
Mitterrand.
67
 According to one source, it was the Ambassador of 
Yugoslavia in Tripoli who did the matchmaker between Greeks and Libyans 
by encouraging the former to propose Papandreou's services to Gaddafi.
68
 
So, Papandreou's visit conveniently combined international activity 
with bilateral economic arrangements, but also with domestic concerns: 
after the congress of the PASOK (May 1984) he needed to show that the 
party had not lost its third road soul; and, following the European 
elections of June, that saw the party's electoral force diminished, he 
also needed to boost his voters.
69
 
The meeting between Mitterrand and Gaddafi took place at Elounda, 
Crete, on 15 November 1984. Elounda was a convenient choice, as neither 
Mitterrand nor Karamanlis wished to have Gaddafi officially invited in 
their respective capitals. There is no official account of the meeting, 
but according to the Greek and French press the negotiations were 
lengthy and laborious.
70
 The Libyan forces were still in Chad, whereas 
the French had already ordered the retreat of theirs (operation Manta) 
before the agreed deadline, which was precisely the 15 November. The 
French had been publicly humiliated by US revelations on the Libyan 
inconsistency just days after a joint communiqué had simultaneously 
been released by the French and the Libyan Foreign Ministries. The Chad 
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affair did not find a solution until two years later, but, at the time, 
Andreas Papandreou was able to reinforce his image as a promoter of 
peace in the Mediterranean and as a mediator between the West and 
Gaddafi, as he had previously obtained the release of French (1983) and 
British (1984) nationals that were detained in Libya. The Elounda 
meeting also coincided with the decision of the Greek government to buy 
40 French Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft, as part of the Greek 
air forces’ modernization programme, decreasing by half an initial 
order that provided for the purchase of 80 F-16s from the USA.
71
 
 
The dissolution of the Greek-Libyan connexion, 
1985-1986 
 
The foundations of the Greek-Libyan relationship were fragile and this 
soon became plainly evident. In 1985, the Reagan administration adopted 
a tougher stance towards international terrorism emanating from the 
Middle East.
72
 In Greece, Karamanlis, whom the US trusted, was no longer 
President, after Papandreou backed Christos Sartzetakis in the 
presidential election of March 1985. As a consequence, direct US 
pressure on the Greek government regarding its relations with Gaddafi 
became stronger. For example, Washington made use of the threat to 
cancel the delivery of the 40 F-16 aircraft, something that would 
affect the military balance between Greece and Turkey. In June, 
following the hi-jack of the TWA 847 Athens to Rome flight by two 
members of Hezbollah, the State Department issued an instruction 
against travel via Athens airport. The warning stayed valid for only a 
month but it was effective, as companies such as Pan-American Airways 
went so far as to temporarily suspend all flights to and from Athens.
73
 
Libyan-backed terrorist activities had indeed become a problem for 
Greece by 1985 (see graphic). According to data available by the RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) on incidents related 
to Middle East-related terrorism in Greece, out of 20 incidents 
occurring between 1981 and 1988, a peak was noted in 1985.
74
 The year 
saw 9 incidents, of which 7 were linked to Libya (Black September, Abu 
Nidal). The Greek government had suppressed the 1978 anti-terrorist law 
in 1983 and although it did not pass a new one, the Greek authorities 
plainly cooperated with the USA and benefited from the training and 
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equipment they were given. By April 1986, the security of Athens 
airport had considerably improved.
75
 At the same time, relations with 
Libya took a different turn: by March 1986, the decision was taken to 
replace Kafetzopoulos, who would join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
as advisor for Arab Affairs, with Vanghelis Hatzimanolis, an economist 
and member of PASOK's committee of foreign relations.
76
 The aim was to 
push for implementation of the 1984 accords and apparently Greece 
attached more importance to the development of the economic aspects of 
its relations with Libya. Undoubtedly, these were also signs that the 
Greek government was careful to preserve its relations with the USA. 
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In 1986, Greek-Libyan relations were further depoliticized under 
the influence of the crisis between Gaddafi and the USA and the 
readjustment of Greek-US relations. In late March, tension between the 
Libyans and the Americans during a US naval exercise in the Gulf of 
Sidra escalated to limited military actions. At the time, Secretary of 
State George Shultz was in Athens (25-27 March) for discussions on the 
future of the US bases in Greece and Greek-US relations, with Libya 
also being part of the agenda. Official Greek reaction to the events 
was cautious and balanced and showed no support for Libyan claims in 
the Gulf of Sidra. The US operation was condemned by the PASOK's 
committee for foreign relations, but the party abstained from the anti-
US demonstrations that were organized in the Greek capital.
77
 
The terrorist attack on the discotheque “La Belle” in West Berlin, 
on 6 April, for which the US – rightly, as was later proved – blamed 
Gaddafi, led to the launch of a series of US air strikes against Libya. 
The EEC countries, with the exception of the UK, did not allow to use 
their military bases in the operation against Libya. Under US pressure, 
they denounced Libyan involvement in terrorism and agreed to restrict 
freedom of movement for the country's diplomatic staff in European 
capitals, but did not take any economic measures against Tripoli.
78
 In a 
speech in the Greek Parliament, Papandreou criticized the US action 
but, in general, Greece's attitude was along the same lines as that of 
all the EEC countries without trying to go it alone. The normalization 
of the Greek government's attitude was best shown when Greece received 
an unexpected – and probably unwelcome – visit of a Libyan envoy 
shortly after the beginning of the US bombings. Ahmad Shahati, head of 
the Libyan Foreign Affairs Office and an old acquaintance of the Greek 
socialists, landed to Athens on 17 April, where he held talks with 
Foreign Minister Papoulias and Papandreou. According to the official 
declaration of the government, Gaddafi hoped for an EEC initiative in 
favour of peace in the Mediterranean. But, Papandreou said, the Libyan 
demand did not mean that Greece would act and, if it was the case, this 
would only be in a European framework. Papandreou also condemned 
terrorism and tension in the Mediterranean. Shahati left Athens only to 
return again in the same evening under circumstances that remain 
unclear. He convoked a press conference around midnight, where he 
denied that Gaddafi had asked for the mediation of the EEC. The 
conference was brutally interrupted by Greek Police officials and 
Shahati was evacuated.
79
 After this inglorious incident, much 
speculation was made about the content of the message of Gaddafi. 
According to Manos Kafetzopoulos, the Libyan leader had asked for the 
active support of Papandreou against the US operations. This meant 
various kinds of support: diplomatic, through an EEC action; 
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humanitarian, by hosting Libyan children in Greece, including Gaddafi's 
children; and even military, by totally forbidding the use of the US 
bases in Greece even for interception purposes.
80
 Gaddafi himself 
confirmed several years later that he had considered launching missile 
attacks against the US bases on Crete. The fact was that the April US-
Libyan crisis revealed a total change in the Greek government's 
attitude towards Gaddafi. In July 1986, following the EEC decisions and 
a Greek-Libyan agreement, the Libyan Popular Office of Athens reduced 
its staff.
81
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Greece's attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 
framework of the EPC from 1981 to 1985 was a conjunction of Realpolitik 
concerns, ideology and even emotional attachment to the Palestinian 
cause. Indeed, relevant Greek action in the EEC offers an interesting 
insight to the connections between foreign policy and emotional 
attitudes inspired by a nation's own history, collective memory and 
even nationalism. In particular, different European attitudes during 
the 1982 Lebanon War show that emotions can be a driving force in 
rational decision making on foreign affairs matters when Realpolitik 
concerns and the balance of power in a collective framework, in this 
case the EPC, allow it.
82
 Greece's energy also shows that the country 
was quick to adapt to the EEC foreign-policy making mechanisms and to 
contribute to decision-making through collaboration with its partners 
soon after fully joining the Community. Greece was able to profit from 
European attitudes when these fitted its general goals and appear as a 
positive and effective player in the Mediterranean. However, there were 
limits and they became evident when bigger players that led the game – 
France or Italy – did not leave Greece enough space or, indeed, when 
Greek positions were out of time. 
The case of Libya, on the other hand, shows a quick Westernisation 
of Greece's policy towards this country under the combined influence of 
three factors: US pressure on Greece, Libyan backed terrorism and the 
liberalisation of European and third world economies that favoured 
developing economic rather than political relations with Libya. In 
1986, from all aspects, Greece's attitude was entirely part of a 
multilateral EEC approach towards the US-Libyan crisis, formalised or 
not, and was even claimed as such. The personal policy that Papandreou 
had followed up until then, in part out of domestic concerns and in 
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part because of the nature of the relations one could have with 
Gaddafi, who totally dominated the exercise of Libyan foreign policy, 
seemed completely outdated once terrorism entered the agenda of 
international relations. The Papandreou-Gaddafi relationship reveals an 
interesting aspect of socialisation between Mediterranean leaders that 
developed also in the name of an updated third-worldism during the 
Second Cold War, only to vanish under the impact of the different 
evolution the Mediterranean North and South and the coming dissolution 
of the bipolar world. 
Last but not least, the shadow of the Cyprus affair and the Greek-
Turkish relations, that one finds constantly behind Greece's Arab 
policy and PASOK's third road approach, would in their turn be 
Europeanised, in the sense of a more denationalised and multilateral 
approach, with the adoption of a positive Greek attitude towards 
Turkey's EU candidature at the 1999 Helsinki Council and Cyprus’s 
accession to the EU in 2004.
83
 These policies were principally led or 
backed by post-Papandreou socialist governments. However, the 
reorientation towards a European option for Cyprus appeared already on 
the horizon in the mid-eighties, as the dissolution of Cold War 
balances was coming into the picture, rendering its foreign policy's 
third world orientations outdated.
84
 
In conclusion, Papandreou's tentative of exercising a 
multidimensional foreign policy during this period shows how fluid a 
concept the Mediterranean eventually remained when faced with 
Realpolitik and domestic concerns, continuous conflict and lack of a 
common European foreign policy. 
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